EXPLORING THE ABSTRACTIONS IN THE PLANNING DEBATE

THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING THEORY

Judith Innes in conversation with Leonard Machler & Dan Milz

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Leonard Machler

Dan Milz
INTRODUCING THE YA BOOKLET SERIES B

Exploring the abstractions in the Planning Debate

This series presents conversations with influential planners in theory to reflect on the path of their career and discuss how they inspired and addressed the development of planning theory. It aims to provide an introduction to their theories and ideas: what and how they contributed to the field of planning; what and who influenced the development of these theories; and how this implicated/ reflected on planning debate in theory and/ or practice. Accordingly, it focuses on their contribution to academic literature. At the same time, it considers significant people and events that have influenced the evolution of the planners' ideas and themes. Our effort has been to present the thoughts in its purest form, and in simple way, making it easy to follow for the first time readers, considering how difficult it is at times to transform ideas clearly.

The process of development of Series B and deciding on the content unfolded various ways of looking at “planning theory”. Firstly, as the first booklet discusses, one way of understanding planning theory was considering “procedural theory” as planning theory proper, as claimed by Andreas Faludi. Faludi’s procedural theory was highly criticized to be far from its origin discipline ‘Urban Planning’. Secondly, there is at least a small group of scholars who readily identify planning theory as literature published in journals like Planning Theory. Thirdly, the other way of understanding planning theory is “abstractions in the planning debate”. As also reflected in the above-mentioned description of the series, we consider the third definition of planning theory for the purpose of this series. However, readers can expect each booklet to be influenced by the particular scholars’ school of thought.

The development of the series is developed in two parts, Part 1 and 2, each comprising of 10,000 words. A YA author develops the first part and the Part 2 is consisted of interviews with other scholars. However, both the parts are graphically compiled together and presented as a whole document in this publication. One of the challenges with this booklet series is that particularly Series B is dedicated to a scholar and NOT to a theory. The challenging task is to summarize the eminent scholars’ long academic life’s contribution in 10,000 words and deciding on the content in terms of “planning theory”. This is the second publication of Series B, with many more in the process of making. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to all the senior scholars of present and forthcoming booklets who have not only enthusiastically agreed to take part in the project, but have also relentlessly supported our YA authors in spite of their very busy schedule.

With thanks and regards

‘Conversations in Planning’ Booklet team
FORWORD

To play video click on this link
https://youtu.be/m6E2FG4M3hw
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction page 8
2. Position and Perspective: Reading, Interpreting and Appreciating Innes’ Works page 10
3. In the Beginning page 12
5. Communicative Planning Theory is Born (1980s-1990s) page 17
6. Collaborative Rationality and DIAD: Communicative Planning as a Craft (late 1990s – present) page 24
7. Responding to the Critics page 32
8. Where can Innes’ Theories be Applied? page 37
9. Conclusion page 40
   Important works of Judith Innes page 41
   Works Cited page 42
   Appendix page 46
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BATNA</td>
<td>Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Complex Adaptive System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Communicative Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAD</td>
<td>Diversity Interdependence and Authentic Dialogue theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

There are a number of questions that seem to nag almost every planning student: Why are some plans successful, while others are not? What makes a plan meaningful and, therefore, useful to the people it affects? How can we design processes that help ensure that plans become meaningful and, therefore, actually used? In other words, how can we help create plans that will make a difference? Every planning student ought to be familiar with the work of Judith Innes because she has devoted her career to exploring these questions.

Innes is not the only planning theorist to ask these questions, but, we will argue, Innes’ work provides perhaps the fullest, most comprehensive guidance for understanding how meaningful planning processes take place. As one of the leading theorists of “communicative planning”\(^1\)(CP) theory, Innes believes that planners are not neutral experts that use knowledge that they learn in schools to solve problems. Nor does she believe that the knowledge used by all actors – including planners – is impartial. Instead, knowledge is “socially constructed”, and the very legitimacy of that knowledge is dependent on how it was produced. By examining the conditions under which useful and influential plans are created, Innes reflects on the role of planners in these processes, the tools that they may use, how we can teach planning students to become more reflective practitioners, and what sort of governance arrangements will support this kind of planning.

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1 Communicative planning, which will be discussed in detail in this paper, can be summarized as a planning approach where planners use dialogue to help people involved in a planning issue to gain a shared understanding of the problem and to reach consensus on what to do. Communicative planning is positioned against systematic planning, in which planners use the expertise that they have been taught to solve planning problems on their own.

2 That is, our knowledge - understanding of how or why things are the way that they are – is developed jointly through our communication and interaction with other human beings. People who believe in the social construction of knowledge reject the idea that what we “know” is developed within us individually without any outside human influences.
Perhaps more than any other CP theorist, Innes has used her career to build communicative planning up from a concept into a practicable craft. Yet, when she began her career as a doctoral student in the 1970s, communicative planning was not even a glimmer of an idea. Her research, at that time, was on a subject that, at first glance, seems completely different: how phenomena like unemployment or crime become measurable. How did Innes’ theories evolve? And which outside influences and interactions led to the development of her theories? We use this booklet to trace the evolution of Judith Innes’ career over the past 35 years. We divide her work into three distinct periods. We examine the prevailing academic thought and the research projects that influenced her thinking in each period. These periods are evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. Innes’ earliest work as a doctoral student – indeed, the “aha!” moment that initiated her lifelong quest to understand why some plans and policies are meaningful, and others are not – continued to have a direct bearing on her latest, and most fully-formed theories. Innes’ work is therefore a complete and cohesive body of work, and our hope is that we succeed in treating it as such.

This booklet is organized as follows: we begin by underscoring the importance of understanding position and perspective when reading any text. This neatly segues into an introduction of how Innes first became interested in planning questions, and how we, as young planners, first encountered Judith Innes’ work. The bulk of this booklet is devoted to describing the three periods in Innes’ professional career, putting them into perspective by examining the academic thought and events that were prevalent at the time, and looking at the research projects Innes embarked on. Throughout this booklet, we include excerpts from interviews we conducted with planning theorists who have known and worked closely with Innes. As much as possible, we have tried to interweave the interviews with the relevant era of Innes’ work that we discuss; the interviews thus flow in parallel to the main text and can be read simultaneously. We end the booklet by presenting some of the typical critiques of Innes’ theories and also by suggesting where Innes’ theories can be applied in planning practice.
Part from learning and absorbing her theories, another reason that students should read Judith Innes’ work is that she provides a good example of how to systematically convey your ideas. Her work is written in clear, simple prose, and the arguments themselves are presented so as to stand out and be memorable. Her ideas develop from a comparative analysis of several case studies; a model case study is typically compared to others that were compromised in some way, so that the lessons between the cases are clear. The theories that emerge from these analyses are usually succinctly presented as a list of conditions, and are often given visual prominence by being separately written from the body of the text. Most importantly, Innes has always been very clear about where her ideas came from. She has a habit of prefacing her work with a story of the personal or professional context in which she found herself, and elaborates on some of the issues that fellow academics were focusing on at the time. Revealing this information is useful for at least two reasons. The first reason is that it guides readers in understanding and reflecting on the ideas that are presented. Many social scientists argue that we do not form our ideas and beliefs independently, but that we are influenced both by our conception of reality (also known as ‘ontology’) and both what we consider to be “knowledge” and how we acquire it (also known as ‘epistemology’). Our ontology and epistemology, in turn, are influenced by the cultural and societal circumstances in which we find ourselves: the culture we grew up in, the beliefs of people in our immediate social circle, our social class, the experiences we endured or the events that happened throughout our lives, among other examples (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). To be critical of new ideas, or to critically reflect on them, we have to be aware of the cultural and societal circumstances that an author originally hailed from, and we must also be aware of our own cultural and societal circumstances as we read along and make judgments. As you read this booklet, be aware that you may form an entirely different interpretation of Innes’ theories and take away different lessons than another person who reads this same text. Similarly, the selection of articles, events, and historical circumstances that we chose to include would be completely different if the booklet had been written by two other authors; your impressions of Innes’ contributions are filtered both through your selective reading and through our selective presentation.
The second reason for providing some personal and historical context is that this technique of communication, also known as storytelling, registers with readers on an emotional level and the ideas that are communicated tend to stick in our memory. Indeed, one of the tools that communicative planning practitioners use to build a rapport with their audience, to get them to listen, and to ultimately build their trust, is to begin by telling a personal story (Sandercock, 2003). Throughout this booklet we will endeavour to not only describe the events and circumstances that led us to encounter and appreciate Judith Innes’ writings, but also the events and circumstances that helped Innes’ theories evolve into what we are familiar with today.
3 In the Beginning

It is instructive to understand Innes’ work, and to understand why she studies the questions she does, by appreciating an event that preceded her doctoral studies; an event that may have first provoked her to question why some information gets used by people in power, while many other forms of information do not. After graduating from Harvard with an undergraduate degree in English, Innes took a job in Washington, DC as a staff member to a US Congressperson, an elected politician who represents a district of roughly half a million people. Innes’ role, along with other staff members, was to conduct research on policy matters, and then to supply the Congressperson with information that he could then consider when a vote was to be held on a proposed piece of legislation. At her disposal were the vast resources of the US Library of Congress, the largest collection of published works in the world. If the library lacked the information, an army of highly capable librarians would conduct research and prepare reports to advise the Congressperson. Initially, she believed that it was the quality of the information in the reports that she prepared that would influence the Congressperson to vote a certain way. She believed that decision-makers are fed different pieces of information from different sources, and that they then make a calculated decision based on the information they have at their disposal. Instead, her experience revealed something very different:

“He barely looked at the information [I prepared], typically calling a colleague instead to get advice on how to vote...it was not a simple matter of the quality or relevance of the information. There was clearly much more at work.” (Innes and Booher, 2010: 144-145)

Innes' theories first began to resonate with Leonard when he read this passage. It was personal; it brought back a memory from his own life. When he was about the same age that Innes was when she was a congressional staff person, Leonard held a job where he prepared research reports to advise corporate decision makers on the viability of certain markets for medical products. Somewhat naively, he thought that the information that he had spent long hours digging up would be used in corporate boardrooms to make important business decisions. He was somewhat disillusioned to learn that, in nearly all circumstances, his reports remained on the shelf and were only dusted off and used when
something he had written aligned, often coincidentally, with a client’s preconceived ideas of how to improve their business. He grew frustrated at the waste of time, money and talent that was expended producing information that no one would use. This notion was reinforced when he had a brief weekend job at his university cleaning out a room full of old technical reports. For hours, Leonard and a handful of other students pulled hundreds of old publications from the rows of bookshelves that lined the walls of the room and dumped them into large recycling bins. Although many of these documents were decades-old, they were still preserved in mint condition, seemingly read by no one. The irony was not lost on him that the shelves were more valuable than the books and reports that had once sat on them, and he was under the impression that whatever report he would write would one day meet the same fate.

Dan had a similar, albeit contrasting experience. Fresh out of planning school, Dan worked as a consultant for an ecological restoration firm. Having become familiar with Innes’ work on indicators as a master’s student, he recoiled at ecologists who insisted that objective metrics of ecological change would influence decision-making. He trudged through prairies in sweltering heat collecting the objective, scientific data his supervisors so desperately desired. He watched them struggle to work with clients who stubbornly challenged the validity of their scientific assessment. He heard them groan about wasting time (and money) debating the merits of data-driven expertise. Dan was eager to teach them about the work of Judith Innes, if only they could be at ease with the process of mutually deciding upon indicators of ecological change. He saw first-hand, the data he collected boxed up and stuffed into a file room in some government building, never to be looked at or referred to again.

Perhaps you have found yourself in a similar situation in a job or experience that you once had. You may have wondered - as Leonard did, as Dan did, and as Judith Innes did – what makes certain kinds of information influential. Why some information gets used, and why others are thrown away. With this we begin an exploration of the first phase of Innes’ research.
4 The Social Construction of Knowledge Period (1975-1980s)

“Judith Innes challenged prevailing ideas about how knowledge was related to action. She recognised that knowledge was not objectively ‘given’, waiting to be discovered, but that it emerged from social processes.”
– Patsy Healey

While her experience in Washington would be pivotal in developing the questions that would inform the rest of her work, Innes’ career formally began with the publication of “Social Indicators and Public Policy” (de Neufville, 1975), a book based partly on her doctoral dissertation in planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The academic climate in planning and the policy sciences in the early-to-mid 1970s was increasingly one that was filled with disillusionment in the capability of planning authorities to make rational plans. Altshuler (1965), for instance, questioned whether systematic planning was possible. Rittel and Weber’s (1973) seminal paper described most planning problems as “wicked”; complex issues where parties who were involved could not even come to an agreement on whether a problem existed, let alone work together to find a way to fix it.

Innes’ work was not concerned with plan-making, per se, but with a study of indicators. Indicators measure abstract social phenomena, and ‘indicate’ whether these phenomena exist and how prevalent their presence might be in society. Throughout the 1970s, there was some interest in developing social indicators in planning and policy research, invigorated by the short-term success of certain economic indicators. The conventional scientific wisdom at the time – and also to a large extent today – was that indicators were developed by experts in the field. Once these indicators were in place, and enough data was collected, the information that was gathered would inform people in positions of power to make the appropriate policy decisions. In other words, knowledge was produced by experts, and knowledge preceded action. But Innes had seen for herself as a congressional staff person that this theory was not accurate in practice. Furthermore, policy researchers of the time, most notably Rivlin (1971) and Allison (1971), also cast doubt on this theory. By the time of her dissertation, alternative conceptions of how
knowledge becomes influential and used had been developed by Caplan (1975; 1979). He theorized that knowledge was unused because researchers and policymakers worked separately and were part of different cultures. Innes found his conclusions a bit wanting (Innes, 1990: 10-11). Because Caplan relied on a survey that asked policymakers and researchers whether they used knowledge, he could only make inferences on why scientific information was unused (ibid). He also could not reveal what the information was, nor could he trace the process by which policymakers encountered that information and how they used it to guide their decision-making.

To address these shortcomings, Innes devoted her research for the book to a historical case study comparing the development and application of three major US social indicators: the unemployment rate, the standard budget, and the crime rate. While we may take some of these measures for granted today, when they were first developed they sought to measure abstract phenomena that were very difficult to define. Who counts as an unemployed person, for example? Some people are not employed, but are not seeking work, either. Others may want to work but have given up their search. Just who counts as ‘unemployed’, and how to go about measuring and reporting this number remains a source of controversy often used for political ends. For example, while interest in having an indicator to measure some concept of unemployment existed as early as the 1920s, progress in developing the measure was slow throughout the 1930s – even in the depths of the Great Depression – because President Franklin D. Roosevelt may have felt that a lack of data gave him the freedom to pursue social policies as he wished (Innes, 1990: 127). For reasons such as these, the unemployment rate indicator would have to wait over ten years to be formally adopted, when the US Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946. Once it was adopted, it was far from established. 1946 would only mark the beginning of the period in which the unemployment indicator was institutionalized; that is, the period during which the indicator, as a form of knowledge, begins to be trusted by people who will eventually have a stake in its use. The Employment Act clearly stated what unemployment meant and what the goals of employment policy should be. Unemployment included all those people who were “able, willing, and [actively] seeking work”. The goals of employment policies would henceforth be to encourage the conditions under which people would find employment opportunities, including self-employment. Thus, before an indicator was agreed upon, let alone applied to measure unemployment in the real world, goals and policies had to be developed. The unemployment indicator was always linked to the goal of providing full employment. This revelation turns the conventional knowledge-before-action wisdom on its head, suggesting that knowledge and action are produced simultaneously, and one cannot be produced without the other.

During the 1950s, the unemployment indicator would be developed in an open, transparent process. The government officials who were involved would publish their methods and data sources in publicly available journals, and readily solicit advice from a diverse array of interested parties. In 1956, a large conference was convened that brought together outside representatives of labour organizations and business interests to help refine and develop the unemployment indicator. When the indicator was openly criticized...
in a popular magazine article in 1961, many of the original participants in the indicator’s design process rushed to its defense. Not just the bureaucrats and government statisticians, but many of the outside attendees of the 1956 conference wrote letters and testified in hearings in support of the unemployment indicator. The indicator remains in use today and continues to be widely cited and well-respected.

The lessons of the unemployment indicator were verified by comparisons with two other social indicators that were constructed over roughly the same time period: the development of a standard budget to measure household expenditures, and the development of an index of crime, known more simply as the “crime rate”. In contrast to the success of the unemployment rate, these other two indicators provided lessons in failure. The standard budget failed to gain widespread respect largely because it was not tied to any specific goals or theories at the outset. The crime rate indicator failed because its development process was far from open, transparent, or inclusive and, as a result, the term was neither clearly defined nor useful to the many groups of people who may have benefited from a recognizable measure of crime. In both cases, the outcome was the creation of comparatively meaningless or useless indicators. The standard budget was used, perhaps grudgingly, because no better indicator existed to measure a vague and undefined concept. The crime rate was hardly used at all; policies were written and legislation was passed to deal with crime, but few actually referred to the crime rate when they made their decisions.

Two theoretical conclusions may be broadly drawn from Innes’ book:

1. The most reliable and influential knowledge is socially-constructed by a broad community of participants which uses such knowledge in an open, transparent process;
2. Knowledge and action are simultaneously produced; knowledge production does not precede the development of an appropriate action, and policies and goals must be known before indicators are created.

The themes explored in her book would continue to inform Innes’ scholarship over the next decade as she assumed a role as an assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Innes would continue to critique the positivist paradigm for separating fact from theory and knowledge from action generation (de Neufville, 1978). Her analysis of how human rights values infiltrated the consciousness of the US State Department (de Neufville, 1986), demonstrated once again that joint knowledge and action production strengthened the influence of a policy decision, validating the theories she had uncovered in de Neufville (1975). The study of how quantitative information can be influential and the study of the public meaning attached to indicators largely characterize the 15 years between the time that Innes published her first book and when that book was republished as “Knowledge and Public Policy” (Innes, 1990). Yet, most planning students who are familiar with Judith Innes’ works seldom encounter papers from this early period. Nevertheless, during this period, events and circumstances, both in Innes’ professional life, and in academic thought, were happening that would help explain the evolution of Innes’ research from the realm of knowledge production to understanding how we should plan.
Communicative Planning Theory is Born (1980s-1990s)

The systematic model of planning, as defined below, was the reigning model of planning in the 1950s and 1960s, and continues to remain the dominant model of planning today. Much like the scientific model of knowledge production, the systematic model of planning has its roots in the philosophy of positivism (Friedmann, 1987). The scientific model of planning proposes that researchers have a pre-existing idea – or hypothesis – of how the world operates, and they design and deploy quantitative tools, such as household surveys, to logically test whether their hypothesis is true or false. Planners would then take this knowledge and design appropriate policies for the problem at hand. The role of research was to explain how things worked, and the goal of planning was to solve problems. This model, with its roots tracing back over 200 years to the Enlightenment, remained unchallenged. However, by the late 1960s and 1970s, planning theorists – many of them originally schooled in positivism – began to express doubts about the viability of the systematic model (Altshuler, 1965; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Increasingly, they felt resigned to the idea that planners could not actually systematically plan. By the 1980s and early 1990s, a new community of scholars would emerge with a radically different idea of what planning was and a decidedly more upbeat outlook on the roles that planners could play. These theorists, known as the communicative planning (CP) theorists, challenged the systematic model of planning head on. Instead of relying on research to explain how the world worked, they suggested that the role of planning research was to understand social phenomena. Planners were not experts that were called in to solve problems, but just one other stakeholder in diverse problems, usually deeply entwined in the problems themselves.

The Roots of Communicative Planning Theory

The emergence of CP theory, although it still remains a point of view subscribed to by a minority of planning academics, was nevertheless revolutionary and offered an escape route from the frustration and cynicism that marked the world of planning theory in the 1970s. Judith Innes is among the principal contributors to CP theory. If CP ever had a ‘coming out party’, it was the publication of Planning Theory’s Emerging Paradigm (Innes, 1995), a powerful piece in the high profile Journal of Planning Education and Research that
declared – in just seven pages and in no uncertain terms – the arrival of communicative planning as a new planning paradigm and its diametric opposition to the systematic model. How did an alternative planning paradigm like CP gain so much traction? What conditions led it to emerge? And how was Innes an instrumental figure in this movement?

Understanding Habermas

Habermas’ communicative rationality theory may be somewhat challenging to grasp. It probably does not help that Habermas’ writing is famously arcane and difficult to understand. It may help you to understand what he was writing about by thinking about an example in your own life. Think about a problem that bothers you. You probably can cite a good reason for why this problem concerns you, and you probably have an idea of how things ought to be. But your very conception of this problem is shaped by the choice of language (words) and the presentation style you use when you learned about this problem, think about this problem, and present this problem to others. This distorted communication reflects distorted power relationships: groups who have more power than others, and can therefore control the conversation, have much more influence in establishing what counts as knowledge. More importantly, how this knowledge is communicated shapes power relationships. This concept is so important that thinkers such as Foucault essentially combine their definition of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’. What you think is “true” may largely reflect what a powerful group felt was true, and the way that you communicate it reinforces the legitimacy of that knowledge, and reinforces that original group’s power.

Externally, the publication of two major social science works – from two very different contexts – was pivotal in developing CP theory. It may be instructive to discuss these works in some detail. One of the greatest influences on CP theorists was the Frankfurt School of social theorists, particularly the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (see above for more discussion on Habermas’ main theories). In his theory of communicative rationality, Habermas (1984) proposed that reality existed, but was hidden under socially constructed understanding, language, and action. These socially-constructed meanings reinforced the power relationships of certain groups that had initially constructed this “knowledge”, and therefore this distorted understanding of the issue was reinforced – or to put it in terms social scientists like to use – reified in society. John Forester (1982) first brought Habermas’ theories to the fore in planning, demonstrating in his case study that planners were not neutral participants in a problem, and they were not just harmlessly transmitting knowledge. Instead, information was being distorted in the choice of words and communication styles that planners were using, and they were reinforcing their power, even if they were not aware of it.

Luckily, Habermas offers a way to avoid the trap of reinforcing existing power imbalances through our communication of knowledge. He suggests that ‘to know’ is to expose and critically reflect on these socially-constructed meanings to understand where they came from, and how they affect people. How can this be achieved? By engaging in a
well-managed dialogue around a problem, where people confront each other and challenge each other’s assumptions (Innes and Booher, 2010: 24). Habermas (1984) outlined several conditions for these dialogues under which the outcome could be ‘rational’. CP theorists, including Innes, would build off of Habermas’ theories and apply it to the planning practice. Can we ever obtain “true” objective knowledge of reality this way? No, and neither Habermas nor the CP theorists are under any illusions that we can. But what Habermas and the CP theorists provide is a template for dealing with the issues that stymied more traditional, scientific attempts at understanding and dealing with planning problems which often only incorporated one perspective- that of the traditionally scientific planner – of looking at problems.

If Habermas provided guidance on “why” communicative planning is important in plan-making, the publication of *Getting to Yes*, by Fisher and Ury in 1981 provided guidance on “how” the negotiation and facilitation that is central to communicative planning may be practiced. Roger Fisher was a Professor of law at Harvard and William Ury an anthropologist, and their *Harvard Negotiation Project* was aimed at understanding techniques that would make managers more effective at bargaining and negotiation between two conflicting parties. The goal of the bargaining processes was to create “good” agreements; ones that were fair and lasting, and that improved both parties’ interests and strengthened their relationships with each other. Fisher and Ury (1981) argued that people entering discussions should keep in mind their “best alternative to negotiated agreement”, or BATNA – an idea of how much they had to lose (or gain) if they did not enter the bargaining process at all. By knowing your limits, you could effectively plan the negotiation process to ensure that you did not risk losing more than what you entered with. You could also assess how much better off you would be if the agreement was successful. BATNA served as an informal measure of your progress in the negotiation process. Similarly, the authors proposed that durable agreements begin when parties outline objective criteria for options.

Fisher and Ury also contended that the best outcomes came about when people entered the bargaining session by focusing on their interests (why they wanted something to happen; why it would be advantageous to them), rather than on their positions (what they wanted, without revealing why). For instance, in negotiating site plan approval, a developer may be interested in obtaining a certain number of units within a defined area. The town may be interested in preserving a certain amount of open space. However, the developer may obscure their interest by anchoring their position at a very extreme value of dwelling units per hectare. The town may, likewise, communicate a very low anchor of nearly no units in the same plot of land. The developer intends to put their interest halfway between their high anchor and a town’s low anchor, and vice versa for the town. Negotiating, in this zero-sum game, would likely lead to an outcome between the two positions, which might not satisfy either party. But, focusing on interests (e.g. maximizing return on investment for the developer and protecting open space for the town planner), might lead the two parties to explore other options for the site instead of trading bulk numbers of units. They might find opportunities for mutual gains by exploring interests instead of haggling over fixed positions.
Lawrence Susskind has influenced Judith Innes’ theories a great deal (Innes, personal communication), and the two actively discussed their ideas while Susskind was a visiting professor at UC Berkeley, where Innes taught. Susskind and Judith have continued to share ideas in conversations with one another over the years. During the 1980s, Susskind also contributed heavily to the emerging field of CP, first championing the idea of incorporating negotiating and mediating skills in the curriculum that planning students were taught (Susskind and Ozawa 1984). Later, his book, *Breaking the Impasse* (Susskind and Cruickshank 1987) was seminal in the field of collaborative policy. He advises that it is extremely important for planning students to receive a good understanding of theory that includes an understanding of how problems arise but also the choices that are open to them to address problems collaboratively.

“We need to be focused on the ways that communities, including networks of agencies and organizations, can reason together to make fair, efficient, stable and wise judgements about the allocation of scarce resources…and the specification of priorities, [especially because] all needs can not be met simultaneously.”

With this quote, Susskind reminds us of why we plan in the first place and underscores the importance of reading Innes’ theories. If resources – space, time, money, and the ecosystem services that support life, etc. – were infinitely plentiful, we would not need to figure out how they would be allocated, nor would ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ be created as a result. We would not need to plan. On the contrary, however, almost all resources are finite and, more critically, scarce.

As planners, our role is not to use our ‘expertise’ to render judgement as to who may acquire these resources, and who may be shut out. Rather, our strength is in bringing the multiple groups who have a stake in a problem together and helping to steer a process where new, shared understandings of what the problem is may be forged, and a collaboratively meaningful, lasting, and adaptable approach to addressing that problem may be imagined. Innes’ writings have provided some of the best guidance on what it took for groups to reach this collaborative rationality. Susskind concludes:

“Collective decision-making in human communities is at the core of the work planners are expected to do… Judith Innes has worked on [these issues] and written about them for many decades.”
Innes immediately recognized the appeal of incorporating Fisher and Ury’s lessons in planning, which was fraught with the same problems: multiple actors fighting over a conception of what to do over a spatial area. At the same time, CP theorists observed that the lessons from *Getting to Yes* meshed extremely well with Habermas’ grand social theories of communication and, ultimately, knowledge and power. Habermas appealed for authentic dialogue: deep, honest conversations where people were aware of where each other group stood, how they came to where they were, and what each stood to lose. Only when these things were realized could lasting, meaningful change for all the parties involved begin to take root. Fisher and Ury provided ample evidence from group bargaining processes that vindicated these theories.

Combining the practical wisdom of Fisher and Ury with the abstract theorizing of Habermas was perhaps symptomatic of how CP theorists had feet planted both in the academic and professional worlds. Unlike the systematic model of planning where researchers and practitioners worked separately, CP marked a change from theory aimed at a closed circle of other academics to theory that would be aimed at practicing planners. Theory was developed by studying what actual planners did, rather than embarking on “armchair theorizing” (Innes, 1995) of what planners ought to be doing. In turn, the theories that were produced were aimed not just at academic audiences but also at planning practitioners. This turn to a practitioner focus is quite apparent in the shift in Innes’ research during the 1980s. It was during this period that she began to cultivate a working relationship with practicing planner David Booher, with whom she worked on many subsequent projects and co-authored many articles. While her indicators project was a historical review of past policy processes, she increasingly began to ground her case studies in live planning exercises in which she was an active observer. Innes made major contributions to CP theory in two areas, in particular.

### Innes Contributions to Early Communicative Planning Theory

Her first area of study was to investigate process conditions under which groups formulated meaningful outcomes. This was a natural evolution from her early work on social indicators, studying the circumstances under which groups construct meaningful knowledge. This time, however, her theories would be informed by the theories of Habermas, the lessons of Fisher and Ury, and from her collaboration within a tight knit community of other CP scholars, such as Forester and Healey. One comparative case study is instructive of the group process theories that Innes developed during this period. In her investigation of state-led growth management plans in Florida, Vermont, and New Jersey (Innes, 1992), she showed that successful plans:

1. Incorporated key stakeholders,
2. Ensured that groups knew that the agreements they reached would matter; participants therefore realized that the task of getting together and collaborating was of importance,
3. Conducted the planning process in a way that all members were given an equal voice,
4. Delegated experts, such as planners, to the role of bridging knowledge gaps between participants (thus attempting to make communication between parties more meaningful and authentic).
The development of this theory shows how her previous work on the social construction of meaningful knowledge is bridged into CP theory via Habermas and Getting to Yes. The first two conditions echo her earlier work on indicators: good processes begin with as much representation of actors involved in the planning problem as is feasible, so as neither to ignore outside views that could scuttle the plan because they were ignored, nor to come up with actions that harmed those who did not have a voice in the planning process. The best processes also had to begin with a shared, prior understanding of what policies or actions would take place. The last two conditions, however, reflect the new influences that Innes and other communicative theorists gained since the 1980s. Innes interviewed the various participants in the three state-led planning processes and noted that the most successful3 of the three – New Jersey’s state-led plan – began with stakeholders focusing on their interests, rather than their positions (viz. Fisher and Ury, 1981). The role of planners is cast in Habermasian terms: they are successful when they were able to communicate the somewhat obtuse technical knowledge of planning to other stakeholders, thereby reducing the risk that the dialogue between participants would be distorted and lead to obfuscation, power imbalances, and mistrust. In contrast, the growth management plans in Vermont and Florida were less successful. In Florida, negotiations did not involve all the stakeholders who had a vested interest in the plans and could not, by extension, grant every key stakeholder an equal voice. In Vermont, state authorities failed to articulate that an agreement would matter and therefore could not persuade the different stakeholders to come together. Instead, “dialogue” occurred because the courts forced opposing stakeholders to mediate with one another.

Given the new role assigned to planners, Innes’ second contribution to CP theory during the 1990s was to provide guidance to planners on how to study communicative planning to become better practitioners. Again, citing Habermas, Innes advised planners to be critically reflective; to reflect on how their ways of communicating and framing a problem to the public might distort information and therefore reinforce power imbalances (Innes, 1998; Innes, 1995), and also to rely on people – not just planners – with a lot of experience to communicate and help uncover where, how and why distorted knowledge of concepts became entrenched. To engage in critical self-reflection and to uncover distortions in knowledge, Innes suggested role-playing storytelling, and bricolage⁴ as examples of negotiation and facilitation techniques to get participants to learn from one another and reach consensus (Innes, 1995; Innes and Booher, 1999; 2010: 128-136). The planning curriculum, she proposed, should be changed accordingly, emphasizing the teaching of these negotiation and facilitation skills to handle group processes, as well as to train practitioners to become better listeners and more open-minded interpreters of different perspectives (Innes, 1998).

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3 Not all aspects of the New Jersey plan were implemented (Neuman, 2000), although this would not have been apparent until after the publication of Innes (1992).

Bruce Goldstein's research focuses on how collaborative stakeholder processes are used in decisions surrounding vulnerable social-ecological systems that have almost been damaged beyond the point of no return, so he gathers lessons that could help people collectively deal with the urgency of sustainable problems in creative ways. For him, a valuable lesson that anyone can learn from Judith Innes is to consider how dialogue — the act of different people actually speaking to one another — can be emancipatory. It is through authentic dialogue that we can break free of old, reified ideas that might force us to act in unsustainable ways, even if we do not mean to do so:

“Dialogue has the capacity to reduce power relations that [structure thought] and get people to be more open with one another…People can be self-revelatory in certain kinds of dialogic settings”

He continues by describing that many planning problems that we encounter are actually the product of everyday planning practices:

“You don’t want to continue to manifest those [practices], because that’s what probably got you into [the unsustainable situation] in the first place…[But] we as planners can create situations through good collaborative processes that open up the sense of possibility that people have.”

In other words, we need authentic dialogue between all the diverse stakeholders in a problem to escape the trap of just attacking our problems with the same, old ideas — some of which may actually be making the problem worse.

The idea that dialogue can help people open up new ideas is not new — it harkens back to Habermas’ communicative rationality theories. But, for Bruce, Innes applies Habermas’ untested concept into tangible process guidelines that planners can actually follow:

“The kind of work that Judy has done and the kind of potential that she’s unlocked in dialogic settings is critical…You know, it ties back to Habermasian thinking and ideal speech conditions, [but] what’s interesting about Innes’ work is tying that into specific guidelines and ideas about how you create and maintain these kinds of processes.”

Bruce’s feedback mirrors our own appreciation of Innes: for her ability to link complex theories into a practicable craft.
By the 1990s, CP had begun to establish a presence in the planning community, and theorists like Innes were instrumental in both its creation and supporting its development. However, the academic world of social science outside of planning was also evolving, pushed by the arrival of new problems that were perceived to be both urgent and global in scope. For a number of reasons, some of which may include the occurrence of high profile environmental disasters resulting from human error during the 1980s (Chernobyl, Bhopal) as well as the recognition of threats to our planetary existence resulting from collective actions of millions of stakeholders with little incentive to change their habits (Climate Change, Ozone Depletion), the concept of sustainability gained importance in both the policy community and among academics during the 1990s. This culminated in major policy and academic conferences, such as the 1992 Rio Summit, the commissioning of the Brundtland report (World Commission on Environment Development, 1987) and the publication of ‘Our Common Journey’ (Kates and Clark, 1999). Sustainability was more than mere environmentalism. Among other things, researchers working in the newly-named fields of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainability science’ acknowledged that the larger environmental problems that affected human societies affected diverse groups of people, often over large areas, and it was difficult for people affected to even agree that a problem existed, much less find conclusive ways to measure the severity of these problems and fix them (Clark and Dickson, 2003; Swart, Raskin, and Robinson, 2004). Most observers acknowledged that problems of this scope could not be solved by straightforward, linear applications of ‘expert’ knowledge (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Gibbons et al., 1994). If this sounds familiar, it is because this paradigm of how the world worked reflected the frustrations of policy scientists in the 1960s and 1970s but, also, the world according to CP theorists who were involved for over a decade in trying to find ways for planning practice to address these issues. What was different this time was that the recognition of this paradigm began to take on a much larger constituency; not just a comparatively small community of communicative planning and policy researchers but legions of ecologists, economists, international development researchers, and decision-makers were involved, among many others. Research foci and funding at universities began to shift toward tackling problems related to sustainability. Perhaps it was prudent for CP theorists to join a burgeoning group, which already aligned so closely with their own view of the world.
With sustainability problems posing some of the most pressing societal issues of our times, new scientific frameworks were needed for understanding why these problems existed. That new understanding came from the emergence of complexity science, a belief that emphasized understanding human and natural systems holistically rather than as assemblies of individual parts. Diverse, complex organizations of actors – whether those were ecosystems or companies – could not be understood by studying just the basic ‘building blocks’ such as workers in a factory or the organisms that inhabited a swamp (Capra, 1982). Likewise, by understanding each and every part, we cannot predict how the system, as a whole, might behave and therefore we cannot rely on this knowledge to make decisions that lead to predictable outcomes (Hwang, 1996). Complexity science contrasted with 300 years of accepted scientific wisdom – the same classical scientific philosophy of the Enlightenment that underpinned systematic models of planning and the scientific theory of knowledge production that we have introduced in this booklet.

More than other CP theorists, Innes began to incorporate the theories of complexity scientists who studied natural systems like the Belgian-American chemist Ilya Prigogine. In his theory of dissipative structures (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), Prigogine observed that natural phenomena like waves could maintain their shape and position over time, despite the fact that individual water molecules were constantly entering and exiting the wave structure. These observations could not be explained using the linear mathematical equations that scientists had traditionally used to explain these phenomena. The idea that the wave, as a system, could be understood by understanding its individual molecules would not suffice. Somewhat uncharacteristically among planning theorists, Innes drew parallels between Prigogine’s thermodynamic theories of natural systems and Giddens’ (1984) sociological theories of how societal systems were structured (Innes and Booher, 2010: 31). For years, debate had raged over whether – and to what extent – people behave the way they do, or how society evolves the way it does, because individuals act freely of their own accord (i.e. agency) or whether the rules and constraints of institutions and groups ‘structured’ our actions into only a small number of permissible ways (i.e. ‘structure’) (Giddens 1984: xviii-xx). In his ‘structuration theory’, Giddens proposed that structure and agency were actually inextricably linked. Individuals, through their everyday activities and behaviour (what Giddens referred to as routinization), developed and imposed structure on others. At the same time, however, those structures constrained those same individuals to act in certain ways. Much like Prigogine’s wave, the values and aspirations of a social organization – like a university, company, club, or even a nation – would maintain itself, even as the people in that organization came and went. Systems

Innes attributes this to both her exposure to early systems theory at MIT in the 1970s, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to her working relationship with David Booher. In the mid-1990s, David Booher had been influenced in his own work by Fritjof Capra’s *The Turning Point* (Capra, 1996), and the two had attended a workshop on complexity science that would be immensely influential on Innes’ future work (Innes, personal communication).

Note that Giddens’ *Constitution of Society* was published in 1984; the same year as Prigogine and Stenger’s *Order out of Chaos*. Innes acknowledges this coincidence in Innes and Booher (2010: 31).
like waves and organizations also adapt to their unstable environments, but they do so in seemingly uncoordinated ways. They exhibit features of what complexity scientists, system scientists, and many sustainability theorists like to call a complex adaptive system (CAS) – a self-organizing and self-maintaining arrangement governed by the interactions between diverse actors in the system, rather than the internal actions of the actors themselves (Innes and Booher 2010: 32; Cilliers, 2005; Tsoukas, 2004; Stacey, 2001).

Innes began to recognize the substantive and procedural appeal of CAS theories in her own work, and argued that planning processes were complex and could be studied using complexity science as a frame of reference (Innes and Booher, 2010: 33-34). Treating collaborative planning exercises as complex adaptive systems dovetailed very nicely with twenty years of prior work that Innes had engaged in. Complexity theory aligned with both the insights she had gained studying how knowledge was produced and her contributions to the development of CP theory. Incorporating a diverse assortment of participants in the planning process was instrumental in assuring that the unemployment indicator would be robust and defensible, and it also helped New Jersey to implement parts of its growth management plan. Now, framed in complexity terms, a diverse array of stakeholders was important for generating new knowledge and identifying broader interests. An excess level of diversity is instrumental for maintaining the organization and structure of the plan-making process as a CAS (Allen, 2001). Furthermore, if planning processes were to be approached as complex adaptive systems, where it would make more sense to study the interaction between individuals rather than the individuals themselves, how else could one study the interactions between human agents in a complex system other than by studying the quality of communication they engaged in? If a CAS like a collaborative planning exercise was to function properly, it would have to include a diverse representation of groups involved in the planning problem and they would have to engage in an authentic, high level of dialogue. What would result would be the self-organizing, self-maintaining, and adaptable system that could respond concertedly to perturbations and change. The outcome would be a resilient system – one that could anticipate and withstand shocks yet maintain its functioning, and perhaps even purposefully adapt to new circumstances as they appeared (Berkes, Colding, and Folke, 2003). Although they were not named as such at the time, Innes encountered resilient complex adaptive systems in the examples of the processes surrounding the development of the unemployment indicator and of New Jersey’s growth management plan.

It is not surprising that complexity science, complex adaptive systems, and resilience - while dating back to earlier decades - began to generate greater interest in the social science community in the 1990s. Not only was the sustainability movement growing in importance, but the 1990s witnessed the arrival of perhaps the best known example of a CAS; the Internet. The Internet is a giant network of interconnected computers sharing information, and is organized without a hierarchy or a chain of command. Yet it maintains itself and has evolved and adapted thanks to the millions of daily interactions of its
users across the globe. In the 1990s, as the Internet began to develop, and as it became apparent that online communities would have a profound and lasting effect on society, a sociologist working down the hall from Innes at Berkeley began to rethink the concept of power in an Internet era. Manuel Castells wrote a series of books on the Information Age (Castells, 1996; 1997; 1998) and argued that power was no longer concentrated in easily identifiable institutions and organizations, but diffused through global networks – often between people with loose or no physical connection to one another. Moreover, and in line with complexity theory, power lay not in powerful people or powerful groups, but in the strength of the interactions between people and groups in this network. Booher and Innes’ (2002) reading of Castells’ network power offered that power was not a finite resource like coal or oil, where some had it and others did not. Instead, they suggested that, under the right process conditions, diverse actors would be able to come together and harness network power to create shared knowledge, political will, and a consensus for action. Network power emerged from these process conditions, and network power also powered these processes. What were these process conditions? From their many years of combined experience in interpreting planning case studies, Booher and Innes boiled the criteria down to three necessary conditions, summarized by the memorable mnemonic “DIAD”:

- **Diversity of Interests**: the full inclusion of participants who have a stake in the problem,
- **Interdependence of Interests**: a recognition by the participants that they must depend on each other to meet their interests,
- **Authentic Dialogue**: the engagement of all participants in face-to-face conversations.

Notice that DIAD is not only theoretically underpinned by complexity science and Castells’ network power, but also absorbs earlier lessons from Fisher and Ury (1981) and evokes Habermas’ (1984) communicative rationality. In a nod to Fisher and Ury, Booher and Innes (2002) suggest that participants will only begin to enter into a collaborative dialogue with each other if they recognize that their BATNA is insufficient to meet their interests. Channelling Habermas’ communicative rationality theory, Booher and Innes (2002) also suggested that perfectly meeting DIAD conditions was probably impossible, but it provided a beacon with which to measure the adequacy of collaborative planning processes and signalled a state worth aspiring to. It is also important to recognize that DIAD conditions have to be followed in a certain order (Figure 1) in order to function. To get groups to the bargaining table, a diverse assortment of participants who are representative of the problem must be assembled, but these participants must also recognize that they need each other (interdependence). Without a diverse representation of interests and recognizing mutual interdependence, the opportunity for groups to negotiate with each other authentically and, ultimately, to reach consensus will not occur.
DIAD is Innes’ ultimate contribution to planning theory. DIAD took centre stage in *Planning with Complexity* (Innes and Booher, 2010), her latest book, in which she reflected on thirty-five years of experience studying planning processes and making planning theories. In *Planning with Complexity*, six major case studies from her career are assessed on how well they correspond with DIAD conditions, and their outcomes on shared knowledge production, consensus-building, and the lasting relationships that stakeholders built with one another are evaluated.

To better understand how DIAD leads to meaningful outcomes, it may be instructive to look at one particularly successful case study in some detail. The Sacramento Water Forum began as a discussion between stakeholder groups with differing interests in the use of water from the basin of the American River, which flows through Sacramento, California (for a more complete overview, please refer to Connick and Innes (2003) or Innes and Booher (2010: 43-53)). Fifteen of these groups began discussions in 1993, led by the City and County of Sacramento, although others would join in as the negotiation process proceeded along. At the onset, several characteristics of the process were noticeable. Ensuring that the problem was diversely represented, was a priority for City and County staff. They identified four different categories of stakeholders based on how they used or valued the water, identified groups that advocated for each of these categories, and then asked members from these groups to select their own representative to participate in the process. While the groups differed, sometimes sharply, on how they saw water being allocated, many of them realized that another group possessed something they needed to meet their interests. For example, the City had access to surface water (water...
from the river), but was blocked from building a water filtration plant on the river by
lawsuits filed by environmental groups; the County had access to groundwater (water from
underground aquifers), but was blocked from accessing surface water that was needed to
keep up with demand. The City needed the County’s groundwater rights, and the County
needed the City’s access to surface water. With a diverse representation of interests and
recognition among these groups that each group needed someone else, the stage was set
to begin negotiations. The dialogue between participants was mediated by an experienced,
outside facilitator. Staff often made sure to spend more time negotiating a subject than
necessary to ensure that every group was fully aware of what they were committing their
organizations to. Before the agreement was implemented, each stakeholder was asked to
carefully present the agreement that they had worked on to their boards. In return, the
stakeholders were asked to return to the negotiation group and report on the reaction
that their board members had had. Throughout the process, there was a high level of
trust between different groups and considerable effort was made to ensure that the level
of dialogue and communication between the groups met conditions of authenticity.
After six years of collaboration, and after spending nearly $10 million on the negotiation
process, a consensual plan was developed for managing water resources in the region for
the next 30 years. The groups found that their interests were reciprocal; that achieving
their own interests could be more easily accomplished by working with other groups to
resolve their interests. The relationships stakeholders made with one another were not only
strengthened, but would last beyond the formal planning process. More strikingly, though,
the negotiation process not only led to what Argyris and Schön (1996) refer to as “single
loop” learning – where actors adjust their actions to adapt to new information – but Innes
claims (Innes and Booher, 2010: 201) that there were examples of “double loop learning”
– where actors modify their beliefs and change the way they look at the problem – as well.
When asked about the issue of water management, one staff member who had been a
former water purveyor began to inadvertently describe the problem from the standpoint
of neighbourhood groups who she had not identified with prior to the meetings.

In Planning with Complexity, Innes not only ruminated about necessary conditions
of collaborative processes, but she also began to consider the institutional infrastructure
that would be needed to support these endeavours. Innes outlined an adaptive governance
framework that would incorporate the diversity inherent in complex problems and in
DIAD conditions, and also ensured that there were ample opportunities for agents to
interact. The takeaway from this last phase is that an increasing emphasis on complexity
science, sustainability, resilience, and complex adaptive systems in the social science
community presented an opportunity for Innes to refocus and realign her theories. Unlike
the transition from the social construction of knowledge to the communicative period, the
transition from the communicative period to the DIAD period was evolutionary, rather
than revolutionary. She did not radically change her research focus, and DIAD theory
involved a retrospective evaluation of case studies that she had encountered over the span
of her career, rather than new case studies in new environments. DIAD can be seen as a
continuation of her contributions to CP theory, albeit refocused along the lines of a new
scientific philosophy, and readjusted for the coming challenges of the twenty first century.
Patsy Healey is also, along with Judith Innes, one of the most prominent and original members of scholars who identified themselves as CP theorists. Being roughly the same age as Judith Innes, the two met early on in their academic careers, in the 1980s, when they were both trying to apply new approaches to understand how people behaved and how policy processes functioned. The two have remained close ever since and have built off of each other’s theories over the past 30 years. While Innes’ theories look primarily at the dynamics of successful group processes, Healey seeks to understand how the set up and functioning of institutions and governance arrangements can lead to transformative change.

Healey recalls that one of the early beliefs that she shared with Innes was the phenomenological approach of understanding how policy processes became successful exercises. That is, to study the everyday behaviour of the group members and how they interacted with one another throughout the entire process to inform our understanding of what was going on in the process. Both Healey and Innes had studied phenomenological approaches for several years before meeting one another, but they approached the concept differently. Healey approached phenomenology through a more institutional and European lens, where it was believed that lives were “[more] structured by powerful economic and political forces.” Innes focused more on the decision-making processes of smaller, overlapping groups around an issue. As Healey explains, the US’ planning system involved many smaller actors operating in a world where power was much more distributed and the scope of these actors often overlapped. The perspective that Innes imparted on Healey was to look not only at the interactions of these actors, but to make qualified assessments on whether these groups, through the collaborative strength of their process dynamics, could make meaningful changes:

“Judith Innes helped me to see that a phenomenological approach implied a focus on the performances and practices of the interactions and relations of planning practices, and to assess them in terms of their progressive and transformative contribution and potential.”
Innes’ focus on group processes and Healey’s focus on institutional arrangements complement one another. From our perspective, it is useful to study both authors’ theories in tandem. Both Healey and Innes hope to see transformative change emerge from groups of people who are stymied by a wicked problem. Innes provides guidance on what a process ought to have in order for collaboratively rational outcomes to take place, but in order for these disparate groups to come together, and in order for these meetings to take place – all of which require a substantial commitment of time and money – there has to be support from governmental bodies.
7 Responding to the Critics

“Setting up a collaborative process does not produce collaborative rationality unless it is done properly. So many theorists say it is impossible and don’t even try.”
– Judith Innes

“Judith has identified the conditions in which communicative rationality is possible to some degree. They won’t be ideal conditions, but I’ve never really understood why people are so obsessed about ‘ideal conditions’.”
– Bruce Goldstein

Even if it is not the dominant paradigm in practice, CP theory has grown into a prominent paradigm in planning theory thanks, in large part, to Judith Innes. Given the prominence of CP theory, this school of thought and, by extension, the theories of Judith Innes, have received their fair share of criticism. Three features that typify the critique against Innes and CP theory are worth noting. First, most critiques are not directed solely at Judith Innes, but aimed at the CP theory community as a whole. An exception to this are papers by rival theorist Susan Fainstein (2000; 2005; 2010), who singles Innes out in much of her critique (see below). A second characteristic of much of the criticism of CP theory is that it has not originated from followers of the systematic model of planning that CP originally railed against (Innes and Booher, 2014). Rather, much of the critique has come from “neo-Marxist” theorists and “political economists” whose theories were never the intended target of CP theory (ibid). This may partly be due to the amount of contact CP theorists have had with theorists who align with the neo-Marxist or political economy camps. Yiftachel (1999) recalls that, during a meeting of international planning theorists held at Oxford in 1998, many of the attendees began to identify themselves in one of either two ideological camps, and the “tenor of the discussion” at the conference began to be dominated by conflict from the two sides. On one side, Yiftachel (ibid) identifies “communicative planning” theorists. On the other side, “critical theorists”

7 Neo-Marxists can be loosely described as theorists who integrate the theories and approaches of Karl Marx – such as focusing on the societal conflict as it arises through relations between social classes – with other intellectual approaches to studying social phenomena.
include Yiftachel, himself, Flybjerg, Hajer, Huxley, etc. Not surprisingly, a third trend among critiques of CP is that many of the papers written against CP theory were published in the late 1990s, following this event (Fainstein, 2000; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Mouffe, 1999; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) or following the publication of an influential book written and compiled by prominent CP theorists (Mandelbaum, Mazza, and Burchell, 1996). During the 2000s and into the 2010s, the volume of critique against CP has slowed somewhat. Innes’ most recent and signature theory, DIAD theory, has not received a lot of opposition in comparison.

Susan Fainstein’s critique is illustrative of members of the critical theory camp (e.g. Yiftachel, Tewdwr Jones, Huxley, etc.), and will be explored in some detail. Fainstein typically criticizes CP and Innes’ theory on two accounts. Fainstein’s first argument against CP is that it fails to look at the deep, economic and social forces that lead to conflict, particularly how powerful groups can subvert and distort authentic dialogue. As Fainstein (2005) writes:

“There is a naïveté in the communicative approach, in its avoidance of the underlying causes of systematic distortion and its faith that reason will prevail...[CP theorists] back away from a concern with ends and aim their spotlight virtually entirely on the planner’s mediating role rather than on what should be done or the context in which planning operates.”

But CP theorists do pay attention to the context in which planning operates. CP theory initially distanced itself from the systematic, scientific model of planning and knowledge creation that prevails, precisely because the systematic model did ”back away” from the context in which planners actually operate. CP theorists like Innes ground their theory by following what actual planners do. Moreover, communicative planning requires a rich understanding of the context in which a planning problem plays out in order to design an appropriate process. Recall that actors who come to the table must engage in critical self-reflection through authentic dialogue. Under these circumstances, one cannot “back away” from the context in which planning operates. Reading any selection of Innes’ case studies will reveal that the histories of the various participants, their interactions with one another, and the rules that bind them, are meticulously detailed and considered in her analysis. Innes and the other CP theorists may not utilize a political economy lens to frame the context of planning problems, but they frame the context nonetheless. Yiftachel (1999), while opposed to CP theory in other works (notably in Huxley and Yiftachel (2000)) and identifying himself as a critical theorist (Yiftachel, 1999), offers perhaps a more conciliatory critique, suggesting that, despite the differences in their approaches, CP theory and critical theory “are not contradictory – and may complement one another” (ibid). Critical theory and CP theory are not at odds with one another, and one may inform the other. Critical theorists can provide an analysis of the circumstances surrounding a planning problem...
before embarking on a communicative planning process. For example, an awareness of the history of power relations between different actors, and the recognition that one group has historically used power to its advantage to subvert other groups, is valuable information for a communicative planner who has to help design a collaborative process. After all, in order for an agreement to take hold, this group – powerful and subversive though they may be – has to be convinced that it should be present at the negotiating table; that they will be better off negotiating with their adversaries, even though they have historically had enough power to get their objectives accomplished on their own. Understanding this group through a critical, political economy lens may help – and certainly will not hurt – planners in finding a way to get them to recognize their interdependence and thus to collaborate.

The conflict between CP and critical theory is both unproductive and disheartening. It is unproductive because both theories can complement each other – one in understanding, the other in action – and it is disheartening because both theories still remain relatively minor perspectives compared to the dominance of systematic planning – a model of planning which neglects both a deeper understanding of the issue and a collaborative mode of action.

Fainstein’s second argument is that communicative theorists privilege the study of planning processes, rather than outcomes (Fainstein, 2000; 2005). For Fainstein, the objective of planning is not how things were achieved, but what was achieved and a consideration of whether that outcome was ‘just’. The objection that Innes and other CP theorists are not concerned with outcomes, especially issues related to equity and justice, in our opinion, misses the point. On the contrary, Innes argues that process and outcome are inextricably linked and one cannot be considered without the other (Innes and Booher, 2014). Many other CP theorists would also agree (see Hoch (2007) for example).

To reiterate, for Innes, a “successful” outcome is one in which a diverse array of stakeholders have come together, engaged in critical self-reflection through authentic dialogue and reached a consensus. What that outcome may be is irrelevant in a general sense, as long as it is consensually agreed upon and reached through an authentically collaborative process.

Take, for example, the Sacramento Area Water Forum, Innes’ case study of water planning in California. By taking a collaborative approach, the stakeholders were able to reach agreements on how best to manage water supplies in the region. The process led to the development of strategies that produced substantive outcomes that met the interests of the more than 41 separate groups who were involved. Had they all agreed to another outcome through proper DIAD conditions, that outcome would still be robust and valid.

8 In 2010 – the same year that Innes wrote Planning with Complexity – Fainstein published The Just City. Like Innes’ Planning with Complexity, The Just City was a work Fainstein printed shortly before retiring, and ruminated on 30 years of experience in planning theory.
Moreover, given the complexity of problems and the introduction of new, unforeseen challenges, outcomes are subject to change. The consensual agreement in the Sacramento Valley may, as yet, produce adverse effects that challenge the long-term sustainability of the water supply in the area. With wicked problems, unintended consequences are always a possibility. Actions sanctioned by the parties in the 1990s might have undesired effects on water supplies in the future. At the time of writing, historic droughts have led to dwindling water supplies throughout much of the Western United States. This drought goes far beyond the provisions developed by the Water Forum for the occasional dry years. There was no way for the stakeholders in the Sacramento region to accurately predict the timing and severity of such events. But the strength of a collaboratively rational process, such as the Sacramento Water Forum, is that the dynamics of the process have been crafted to foster an awareness of interdependence through empathy. As independent stakeholders learn to recognize their shared stake in a resource like water, they develop a new, shared sense of that resource that transcends their individual interests. The process can produce the necessary conditions for the stakeholders to jointly anticipate and respond to severe shortages as they arise, or as unintended consequences emerge over time. These timely responses are much harder to engineer in the absence of a history of collaboration and a consensus for action. With regard to DIAD, Innes distinguishes strategies for action as first order effects and system adaptations for future collaborative efforts, again referencing Argyris and Schön (1996).

A rare practitioner-focused critique of CP theory is offered by Neuman (2000) who was involved as a planning manager in the New Jersey growth management plan chronicled by Innes (1992), but later assumed a position as an academic at Texas A&M University. Speaking primarily from experience in the field, Neuman’s critique centers on CP theorists’ interest in reaching consensual outcomes; he expresses skepticism that consensus can be achieved in actual practice:

“Is consensus in a planning exercise strong enough to withstand political forces of implementation in the real world?” (Neuman, 2000)

In practice, Neuman contends, consensus making is not only stymied by process conditions, but by factors beyond the control of planners or people who organize collaborative planning processes. For example, the timing may not align between when a planning process happens and when stakeholders report back to their respective groups. Some representatives may enter a negotiation process less informed than others, not because they are incapable, nor because of their dialogical skill, but because the logistics may not have worked out for them. Collaborative processes may have been scheduled

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9 In the case of the Sacramento Water Forum, a successor group was set up that continues to monitor the water situation and address unanticipated events and consequences.
10 That is, a critique not grounded in an alternative academic theory but an observation of communicative planning and consensus-making in practice.
11 Neuman’s own emphasis.
months before representatives were to be briefed on their organization's formal interests or stance on an issue. Neuman also sees issues with how consensus is reached:

“When it becomes apparent that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get agreement about a problematic issue, consensus process participants adopt a multitude of tactics to avoid an impasse.” (Neuman, 2000)

This suggests that participants, in the interest of time, might agree to a resolution in order to reach a speedy conclusion, even if that conclusion conflicts with their own long-term objectives. As our review of Innes’ Sacramento Water Forum and unemployment indicator projects have shown, collaborative processes are major time commitments, and it may not be surprising that some participants might wish that meetings wrap-up more quickly. But this is not a valid criticism of what consensus represents nor is it a valid criticism of the success of CP or Innes’ theories. Indeed, Neuman inadvertently underscores why Innes’ theorizing is necessary. It is critically important to understand how good group processes are designed, and to reveal how badly-managed processes can lead to inauthentic dialogue (such as hastily agreeing to “consensus”, even if that agreement conflicts with your own interests), and the fallout and wrangling that may follow. The logistical disconnect between when meetings happen and when representatives may brief their board of directors points to the need for better institutional design and a governance system that accommodates logistical constraints within organizations, whatever those might be. And indeed, due to rapid advancements in global telecommunications (e.g. email, video conferencing, etc.), these logistical issues might not be as problematic as they once were.

To conclude this section, we will explore other issues with Innes’ theories that have not received widespread attention, and mostly reflect our own observations as students. As a theory explaining successful collaborative processes, meeting DIAD conditions is hard to argue with; of course we should foster diversity and open, authentic dialogue! Also, it does not seem conceivable that a process would achieve successful outcomes if one of the conditions - diversity of participants, recognition of interdependence between participants, or authentic dialogue between participants once they sit down at the same table – were not met. However, Innes has focused her attention more on understanding the tools planners may wield to achieve authentic dialogue, but has put less emphasis in trying to understand how different actors – some of whom may vehemently disagree, or even hate one another – convince themselves that they depend on their adversaries to move forward. This is a question that still remains. As research by Kahneman (2011) shows, overcoming individual cognitive biases is very difficult for simple problems. Imagine how difficult changing minds can be when the economic and political stakes are high. The Sacramento Water Forum was quite fortuitous in that participants recognized that they needed each other, and this was the catalyst for a collaborative engagement. But there are many other situations in planning where powerful groups feel that they can achieve their objectives alone, or, if not, that they can find creative ways to sidestep engaging with other parties to get what they want. Some questions remain; can this situation be replicated in other planning stalemates? What role should planners play in getting opposing parties to realize that they need each other, and how should they go about it?
8 Where can Innes’ Theories be Applied?

“Planners MUST understand why and how various problems emerge and why and how various approaches to [responding to problems] are likely to work...Everything else is secondary.

Judith Innes has been presenting theoretical insights along these lines her entire career.”
– Lawrence Susskind

“To know how to foster dialogue and how to create conditions in which good dialogue is fostered is a critical part of planning. You often don’t see that in the planning curriculum, and yet you often hear that as being identified as the core expertise among senior planners. This is a practical lesson that can be drawn from Judy’s work.”
– Bruce Goldstein

Getting to DIAD conditions is a challenging task that requires a great deal of coordination, resources and time. For instance, reaching agreement on the Sacramento Water Forum took $10 million, 6 years, and the organization of 41 different entities. Many of the problems that planners encounter in their day-to-day practice may not require such a Herculean undertaking. Where actors have little personal stake in an outcome, and where there is a low possibility of conflict, a slight modification to existing rules and regulations may simply lead to predictable, efficient outcomes for all parties. For example, a property developer seeking a minor change to an existing zoning rule may have a handful of discussions with a city planner and resolve the issue in a short amount of time. Bargaining and effective communication practices may be central in reaching a good agreement, but it is likely unnecessary for the two parties to engage in critical self-reflection or to forge a deep, shared understanding of the issue from the other party’s perspective.

DIAD is perhaps best applied to large-scale, long-term planning problems that involve a diverse array of affected stakeholders, each with a different conceptualization of what the problem is, what needs to be done, and whose conflicting interests may even lead to stalemate. The planning processes that Innes and Booher have studied, and which
we have introduced in this booklet, belong to this category of planning problem. They include: national social indicators like the unemployment indicator, comprehensive plans to manage growth between municipalities and counties at the state level, and agreements to share access to water in a large ecosystem over a 30 year timeframe.

When we asked long-time collaborator David Booher about where he would like to see new scholars take their theories, he also stressed the importance of governance arrangements that encourage DIAD-type processes. Interestingly, he turned our idea on its head! Rather than pondering on how better governance arrangements could help foster DIAD processes, he wondered whether – and how - DIAD processes could improve how institutions run:

“The one area I think offers much potential [for future research] is to better understand how collaborative rationality can improve the performance of traditional governance institutions. Much more work needs to be done on whether collaborative rationality can remake governance and, if so, how. Or, if not, what other vision is required so that our governance institutions are up to the challenges of the age of complexity.”

David Booher’s comments underscore perhaps the last comment we wish to make on Innes’ theories, and on studying and appreciating theory in general: that theories are never complete and set in stone; they always exist as works in progress that new communities of interested people should be able to critically interpret and apply to the endeavours that are important to them.

Many planners will not encounter these problems that often in their day-to-day practice, but most will need to be involved in a long-term strategic plan that requires a high degree of collaboration at some point in their career\(^1\). Some planners will encounter these situations more often than others, while some planners will often specialize in negotiation and facilitation techniques and spend their time almost exclusively working on these kinds of collaborative processes. Even more likely, many planners will act as stakeholders in these kinds of processes, representing the interests of the groups they work for. Public participation and citizen input are already required in many public decisions in the US. But, as Innes and Booher (2004) point out, many public processes are poorly
run, tokenistic gestures to citizen participation, where groups are presented with courses of action that bureaucrats have already decided on. Unsurprisingly, decisions that fail to incorporate the lessons of good process design fail to gain credibility and often disintegrate when conflict flares up again among those actors who were not properly consulted (ibid).

Almost all planners will need to be involved in a participatory planning exercise at some point in their lives, and effectively designing and facilitating collaborative processes is arguably one of the most challenging tasks that they will face. However, the risk of not designing a collaborative process properly is substantial; not only the inability for different groups to reach a meaningful agreement, but wasted time, wasted money, and the erosion of trust. More than any other theorist, Innes provides guidance on what good collaborative processes consist of and what the effects of those processes are, both immediately and in the future. Therefore, for nearly any young aspiring planner, Innes’ theories are indispensable.

12 An important skill for all planners to have is to recognize when a planning problem is something simple enough to be solved through the usual procedures, and when a planning problem is something more systemic, wicked and benefits from a collaboratively rational approach.
9 Conclusion

“I hope emerging planning scholars will take the DIAD theory in directions that I can’t even imagine now.”
– David Booher

Judith Innes’ career has spanned nearly four decades. These four decades witnessed the arrival of new thinkers and new ideas, new problems and new ways of seeing the world. Her theories have evolved accordingly. Beginning with her awareness as a Congressional staff person over what kind of knowledge and information becomes meaningful and useful, Innes has used case studies of planning processes to understand the conditions under which groups can tackle complex planning problems and reach lasting consensus. The arrival of communicative theories in the 1980s and complexity theories in the 1990s enriched her thinking, culminating in the 2010 publication of Planning with Complexity, her magnum opus, where she reflected on her life’s work and provided guidance on how successful collaborative planning operated. For planning students, the works of Judith Innes are invaluable; while Innes shies away from declaring that her works provide guidance on how to plan (Innes and Booher, 2010: 14), her theories provide a comprehensive overview of the conditions inherent in the most successful collaborative planning exercises. Her contribution to communicative planning theory and to planning theory, in general, is profound.


Interviewees

**BRUCE GOLDSTEIN**
Bruce is an Associate Professor in the Program in Environmental Design and the Program in Environmental Studies at the University of Colorado Boulder, and a faculty research associate in the Institute for Behavioral Science. His work focuses on how learning networks can catalyze change in durable institutions that are approaching social and ecological thresholds. Bruce is collaborating with his project team on four projects – a network-scale resilience assessment in partnership with the Fire Adapted Communities Learning Network, a study of critical infrastructures within the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Initiative, and a study of the Locally-Managed Marine Areas Network in the South Pacific (see [http://www.brugo.org/](http://www.brugo.org/)).

**LAWRENCE SUSSKIND**
Lawrence Susskind is Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vice Chair of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and Founder/Chief Knowledge Officer at the Consensus Building Institute.

**PATSY HEALEY**
Patsy Healey is Professor Emeritus in the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape at Newcastle University. She has qualifications in Geography and Planning and is a specialist in planning theory and practice, with a particular interest in strategic spatial planning for city regions and in urban regeneration policies. She is also known for her work on planning theory.

**DAVID BOOHER**
David Booher has collaborated with Judith Innes since 1998. He is the Senior Policy Advisor at the Center for Collaborative Policy, California State University Sacramento. He is the Founder and an Emeritus member of the California Planning Roundtable and a former President of the California Chapter of the American Planning Association. In addition to his consulting practice and work with Judith, David has taught collaborative governance practice graduate courses at CSUS. David received the MS in Planning from the University of Tennessee and the MA in Political Science from Tulane University.
**Judith Innes** is Professor Emerita of City & Regional Planning at University of California, Berkley. She holds a Ph.D. from MIT’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning and an undergraduate degree in English from Harvard University. Innes is one of the proponents and main contributors towards communicative planning. As the authors mention in the booklet, she built communicative planning up from a concept into a practicable craft.

“Judith Innes challenged prevailing ideas about how knowledge was related to action. She recognised that knowledge was not objectively ‘given’, waiting to be discovered, but that it emerged from social processes.”
– Patsy Healey

“Collective decision-making in human communities is at the core of the work planners are expected to do… Judith Innes has worked on [these issues] and written about them for many decades.”
– Lawrence Susskind

“Judith has identified the conditions in which communicative rationality is possible to some degree. They won’t be ideal conditions, but I’ve never really understood why people are so obsessed about ‘ideal conditions’.”
– Bruce Goldstein